

been shaped so they automatically arrive at particular conclusions.<sup>5</sup>

Krutch believes mankind can only be saved if enough of the mechanist's assumptions are rejected, thus salvaging what he calls "Minimal Man". In "Minimal Man" reasoning would not always be rationalization, and consciousness would sometimes be more than mere epiphenomenon. Since Minimal Man's values would not simply be those he was conditioned to accept, he could think of himself as having some freedom even though he would remain part of an aggregate whose behavior could be predicted in statistical terms. It would be the duty of Minimal Man to cultivate his freedom in hopes that other human beings would also realize they are not constrained to obey the statistical laws of determined science.

Krutch believes Minimal Man is as defensible and reasonable a conception as Determined Man. He does not think the findings of the laboratory lead inevitably to the conclusion that free will is dead. He writes:

All the real evidence in favor of mechanistic assumptions is partial. All the arguments against any other assumptions are merely negative. They consist in saying only, "I have evidence that the body resembles in certain respects, a machine; I have evidence also that the mind can, in certain ways and to a certain extent, be conditioned." Therefore, I assume that nothing not explicable in mechanist terms exists.<sup>6</sup>

The behaviorist admits that he can not predict every human act at present, that in some instances he can only predict group behavior, and that there may be insurmountable technical hurdles which will forever keep him from achieving complete prediction. He insists, however, that in principle complete prediction is possible, and that man is determined even if the methodology of science is not yet sophisticated enough to reveal the order which exists.

Krutch rejects the behaviorist's reasoning. He argues that it is not the scientist's methods which are at fault. He believes there is an element of spontaneity in human behavior which will forever limit the degree to which the behavioral scientist can account for human activity. Krutch also believes there are aspects of man which are now, and will always remain, inaccessible to scientific study, thus limiting the progress which behavioral science can expect to make. He rejects Skinner's argument that the deterministic view cannot be seriously questioned in view of the success which the behavioral sciences have already had. He argues that science really hasn't been very successful since it has been able to deal only with the "crudest manifestations of

## KRUTCH'S ATTACK ON DETERMINISM

Most of Skinner's various critics have followed the same line as Rogers, although a few have gone somewhat further in their criticism. In some of the critics' comments there are also elements of bitterness, despair, and hostility towards science that are absent in Rogers' writings. The authors of a book on Utopias, for example, damn *Walden Two*, saying:

Halfway through this contemporary utopia, the reader may feel sure, as we did, that this is a beautifully ironic satire on what has been called "behavioral engineering". The longer one stays in this better world of the psychologist, however, the plainer it becomes that the inspiration is not satiric, but messianic. This is indeed the behaviorally engineered society, and while it was to be expected that sooner or later the principle of psychological conditioning would be made the basis of serious construction of Utopia — Brown anticipated it in *Limanora* — yet not even the satire of Huxley is adequate preparation for the shocking horror of the idea when positively presented. Of all the dictatorships, espoused by utopists, this is the most profound, and incipient dictators might well find in this utopia a guidebook of political practice.<sup>1</sup>

The noted essayist Joseph Wood Krutch has seen fit to describe *Walden* as an "institution" and its citizens as "inmates" who have voluntarily committed themselves to being conditioned to like conditioning.<sup>2</sup> He is of the opinion that it is an "ignoble Utopia" because it does not appeal to man's reason, but "puts its faith in the conditioned reflex instead, and proposes to perfect mankind by making individual men incapable of anything except habit and prejudice".<sup>3</sup>

As these comments indicate, Skinner's critics are particularly disturbed by determinism and conditioning; or as Andrew Hacker put it, by the Specter of Predictable Man.<sup>4</sup> While most of the critics acknowledge that all men are affected by their environment, they feel there is a difference between being conditioned through conscious manipulation and being influenced in an unplanned, accidental way. Andrew Hacker, for example, argues that only those who do the conditioning can still be considered free and self-directing. Those who are conditioned are not autonomous, since their whole minds have

## DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM

human nature" and not with man's creative side.

As Krutch sees the situation, the "stubborn fact of consciousness" constitutes the strongest possible evidence against the mechanist hypothesis. He believes the scientist's inability to find consciousness in a test tube is proof of the shortcomings of science, and categorically denies that such inability is proof that consciousness does not really exist or is unimportant. In fact, he maintains that consciousness is the only thing which we have direct knowledge of, and that only through it do we "know" the nature of our behavior.

Krutch contends that the existence of consciousness:

"disposes of any merely a priori reasons to believe that it (the body) might also be capable of exhibiting phenomena no more difficult to understand in terms of physics, chemistry, or even logic, than is simple consciousness itself."<sup>7</sup>

Since man is conscious, he cannot be a machine for, although a machine may "reason", it is not aware of itself, does not have a sense of values, and does not feel or want as human beings do.

Krutch rejects Skinner's characterization of consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon or by-product. The development of higher and higher degrees of consciousness signifies to Krutch that consciousness must have a survival value of its own. It, therefore, cannot be a useless epiphenomenon but must have emerged as a phenomenon in its own right sometime in the course of evolution. He believes that consciousness introduced a qualitative novelty which suggests the possibility of some sort of autonomy for man. Consequently, he deplores Skinner's view of life as "nothing but" chemistry, and the brain as "nothing but" a machine which can "learn" reflex actions only in the way that electronic calculating machines can "learn" what their manipulators want them to.<sup>8</sup>

In fact, psychologists do accept the reality of consciousness, although unlike Krutch, they do not feel this obligates them to reject the determinist frame of reference. Some take the parallelist's position that mental and physical events are of equal importance in a determined world. In the parallelistic view the relationship between mind and body is symbolized by the Leibnizian image of two synchronized clocks. The body runs according to its mechanical laws; the mind operates in accordance with its principles. For every psychical state there is a corresponding physical state. However, the two are not causally related, the mind neither changing the body, nor the

body the mind. The parallelist asserts that behavior can be predicted using only information about present and past behavioral, physiological and environmental variables, since in principle, any statement which mentions only these variables can be coordinated with a statement about mental events such that they are either both true or both false.<sup>9</sup> It doesn't matter that there are no words to describe these mental states, nor that the psychologist can't handle consciousness as he does behavior, for as long as mental events are parallel to physical ones, the translation is not really necessary. The psychologist can predict and control, given his knowledge of the behavior and the physical states of the organism, even though he cannot describe and deal with mental states. Thus, this formulation allows the psychologist to acknowledge the "mind" while at the same time freeing him to ignore it in his laboratory. It is quite understandable that historically such a formulation proved to be a great boon to psychology.<sup>10</sup>

It is possible for the psychologist to deal with phenomenological behavior within the determinist frame of reference. I. E. Farber, an S-R theorist interested in "personality", writes:

The fact that a person may say or feel that he has the freedom to respond or not as he chooses, may very well influence his choice. The fact that mediating mechanisms, verbal or otherwise, may influence behavior offers no more difficulties for S-R psychologists than any others, except that they are likely to be impressed with the necessity for investigating the causal relations into which these mediating processes enter, instead of being perpetually astonished by the mere fact of their existence.<sup>11</sup>

At present, there is no way to end the argument over the limits of behavioral science. It is impossible to demonstrate conclusively that one side or the other is right or wrong. In some respects the argument is rather pointless, a verbal exercise and little else. If there actually are regularities and the scientist's techniques for uncovering them are adequate, they will be uncovered. If, on the other hand, there is a random element in the universe or there are areas of life which the scientist is unable to explore, these will in the end define the boundaries of science. Whatever order exists will be discovered only as a result of scientific investigation into nature, not of argument or of the exercise of reason. The limitations will simply limit science.

In some ways it is difficult to understand the appeal of indeterminism. Since determinism means only that events are caused (not to be confused with the notion that events are predestined or fore-

told) the critics must prefer to believe there are uncaused happenings. This preference for the indetermined would seem, however, to be based on a misconception. When the scientist says one event is "caused" by another, he does not mean to imply that there is some kind of inexorable, absolute bond between the two events so that the first "forces" the second to occur. Scientific laws are not like the laws of the polity and the two should not be confused. We are not forced to obey scientific laws. There is no coercion involved, no armed policeman standing by. A scientific law is simply a statement of what has been observed to have happened in the past. Either because the observation has been made many times, or, more likely, because the relationship makes more sense in conjunction with other facts and fits into a logical structure of concepts (a theory), the scientist believes the relationship will occur again in the future.

The scientist's belief in regularity is based on faith. There is no logic by which he can prove that what has happened in the past will happen again in the future. He simply believes it to be true, just as we all believe the sun will set again tonight and rise again tomorrow. Surely Krutch would be as surprised as Skinner if the sun were never again to come up. Even Krutch would have to admit that a degree of regularity is essential to the continuation of human life, and that this regularity is more than a necessary evil. Without it our lives would be filled with uncertainty. The time and energy saving routines which permit us to do more than merely exist could not have been developed.

Total chaos is virtually impossible to imagine. Life could not exist in a totally random world. Moreover, without some determinism man would have no freedom at all. He could never choose effectively because he would have no idea what the outcome of various courses of action would be. The regularity in the world and our knowledge of it increase our freedom.

We can use our knowledge to change the world, to plan a better life, to achieve our goals. Seen in this light, behavioral science need not be feared, for it can add to our freedom. Science could be used to enslave man but there is nothing in knowledge which dictates this outcome. To reject science is to reject the hope of a Golden Age as well as the threat of 1984. To halt research (assuming this were possible) out of fear that indeterminism will be forced to retreat until it has nowhere to go, would be to condemn every neurotic and psychotic to his own private hell, to ensure that we continue to bumble along as we do now, with every prospect that the state of the world will never be greatly improved. Possibly behavioral sci-

ence will fizzle out and fail to contribute significantly to bettering human life. Perhaps knowledge will not be enough to redeem the world. Man may in fact be emotionally incapable of using knowledge without destroying himself in the process. Maybe, as Niebuhr claims, man is tainted by a kind of original sin. If this is so, man is already damned and behavioral science won't make any difference one way or the other. All things considered, there is little to be lost, and perhaps, much to be gained by continuing to try to understand ourselves.

The arguments Krutch advances against psychology are puzzling. If psychology really is so unsuccessful, why is Krutch crying that psychologists are dangerously knowledgeable and have already begun to reduce us to robots. Farber, who has pointed out the contradiction in Krutch's attitudes, feels:

The essential ingredient in such views is a distrust of science. Those who bemoan our lack of knowledge concerning the factors governing intersocietal and interpersonal relations are frequently the same people who condemn the use of those procedures best calculated to achieve that knowledge — the methods of science. If these forebodings were taken seriously, we should have to conclude that even if we knew how to make our educational system more effective, even if we knew what kinds of conditions in our homes and schools would increase the probabilities of our children's becoming responsible citizens, we ought nevertheless refuse to establish such conditions on the grounds that this would constitute undesirable control. Even if we knew how to allay those suspicions and change those motives of individuals and societies, the consequences of which now threaten the world with unprecedented disaster, we ought not act because this would violate men's dignity.<sup>12</sup>

## DETERMINISM WITH FREEDOM AND DIGNITY

Those who fear the growth in man's ability to understand and predict behavior are not only concerned about the possible misuse of this knowledge in its application to social affairs, but about the psychological affects such knowledge will

have as well. They fear that behavioral science (even if it is not used to produce the Planned Society) will rob man of his freedom and life of its spontaneity and meaning. They feel determinism cannot be compatible with freedom and responsibility and do not see how man can live without regarding himself as free and responsible. For example, Joseph Wood Krutch has written that:

the complete rejection of the concept of human responsibility and of all belief in the human being's ability to do anything for himself is pragmatically impossible. A society which consistently acted on the unqualified assumption that no one could be held in any sense responsible for himself or his acts is unthinkable, and if all contrary assumptions are really based on an illusion, then that illusion is indispensable both to the life of the individual and to the life of the social organism of which he is a part.<sup>22</sup>

Krutch's "answer" to the problem of determinism and freedom is his argument for the existence of a Minimal Man whose behavior is not entirely determined. However, many critics are uneasy with this solution. They regard it as a stopgap measure which will become more and more unacceptable as science advances. People like Rogers find themselves in conflict because they cannot deny determinism, but at the same time cannot bring themselves to accept Skinner's conclusion that man's accomplishments "appear to approach zero",<sup>23</sup> because every act is controlled and control always rests outside the individual in his environment.

In reality, no one, not even Skinner, really regards himself as a puppet. One of Skinner's Harvard colleagues, E. B. Boring, has commented:

Do you want to know where to find a free man, a man who acts as if he were free and thinks of himself as free (and how much freer could he be than that)? Go to him who is earnestly trying to persuade that all men are robots. He will not claim that his order was designed into him and has no necessary connection with the validity of what he is saying. If he calls himself a robot, still he will not act like one, for it takes a free man to start a war on freedom. An IBM machine does not have the dignity to make an argument convincing, and an IBMpty organism is a poor evangelist.<sup>24</sup>

Even Frazier, while he says he is conditioned, seems to take pride in the fact that he has conditioned others and that he alone has not adjusted to Walden. If one were to live according to Frazier's professed philosophy, refusing to take purpose or decision seriously, life would

become an "absurd" affair of the moment without direction or meaning. It is difficult to imagine science or the other great achievements of man flourishing under such circumstances. Man cannot live as if he and his accomplishments amounted to nothing, nor can he deny his feeling of selfhood — the feeling that it is "he" who is acting and perceiving. In our society the man who really believes he is not under his own control and acts like a robot, is considered psychotic and given psychiatric treatment.

If we use Skinner's definition of control, it is true that behavior is always controlled. There are always reasons for the things human beings do. There are always stimuli, either internal or external, which serve as the occasion for action. However, control, taken in this sense, does not destroy the experience of freedom which is so greatly valued by Skinner's critics. Determinism is not incompatible with feeling free. It is unfortunate that Skinner has to use the word "controlled" as a synonym for "caused". Usually when laymen speak of "being controlled" they have in mind that some person is trying to control them and forcing them to behave as he wishes. Skinner would be the first to admit that men can be, and often are, free from such control. In these cases, men feel free and do what they want to do, although of course, they cannot do anything they fancy. No thoughtful man defines freedom as unlimited choice. We all recognize certain physical limitations on our behavior and neither resent them nor feel they rob us of our freedom.

Skinner's critics have unwisely generalized their attack on him to an attack on science, when what really bothers many of them is not science but Skinner's personality as he expresses it in his writings — his choice of words; his manner of argumentation; his abrupt dismissal of philosophy, history, democracy, and religion; and the seeming egotism and air of superiority which is best illustrated by his comparison of the psychologist to God in which God comes off second best.

Critics like Hacker and Krutch and the humanistic psychologists also react against Skinner because he seems to be more interested in people as experimental subjects than in them as human beings with feelings and desires. While Skinner may really feel his ultimate goal is the improvement of human life, he does at times appear to stress the means to the exclusion of the end. Moreover, he denies the basic mystery of life — the fundamental "whys" of life and death, although men might well fail to find the physiologist's explanation a fully satisfactory answer to the question of why men live and die.

It is possible to use scientific principles similar to those employed by Skinner to devise a model of the Good Society which is markedly different from Walden. Aldous Huxley has actually done so in *Island*, a novel presenting his picture of Utopia (not to be confused with his anti-

Utopia of *Brave New World*). Huxley does not reject conditioning, drugs, eugenics, and the like as so many humanists do. Rather, he uses them to construct a world in which the life of the individual, particularly his private mental life, is enriched and enhanced. Huxley's Utopia also has a

place for the religious attitude, for his approach to the human being is much the same as Rogers. And, like Rogers and the rest of Skinner's critics, it is his attitude, more than anything else, which sets him apart from Skinner.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Glen Negley and J. Maxpatrick. *The Quest for Utopia* (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1962), pp.582-583.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Wood Krutch. *The Measure of Man* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1953), p.57.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p.58.

<sup>4</sup> Andrew Hacker. "The Specter of Predictable Man", *The Antioch Review*, Summer, 1954, pp. 195-207.

<sup>5</sup> Andrew Hacker. "Dostoevsky's Disciples: Man and Sheep in Political Theory", *The Journal of Politics*, 17 (November, 1955), p.608.

<sup>6</sup> Krutch. *The Measure of Man*, p.105.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p.120.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p.135.

<sup>9</sup> Gustav Bergman. "The Contribution of John B. Watson", *Psychological Review*, 36 (1956), p.271.

<sup>10</sup> Gustav Bergman. Lecture given August 2, 1962 in his course "Philosophy of Science", State University of Iowa.

<sup>11</sup> I. E. Farber. "Stimulus-Response Approaches to Personality — Some Presuppositions", Prepublication draft to be published in *Personality and Change*, ed. P. Worchel and D. Byrne (Mimeographed), p.7.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12.

<sup>13</sup> Joseph Wood Krutch. *The Measure of Man* (New York: Grosset's Universal Library, 1954), p.53.

<sup>14</sup> B. F. Skinner. *Cumulative Record* (enlarged ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1961), p.7.

<sup>15</sup> Edwin G. Boring. "When is Human Behavior Predetermined?" *Contemporary Readings in General Psychology*, ed. Robert S. Daniel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), p.344.

#### Study Objectives

1. Why does Joseph Wood Krutch consider Walden Two an "ignoble utopia"?
2. What distinction does Andrew Hacker make between those who do the conditioning and those who are conditioned?
3. With regard to Krutch's concept of "minimal man", why does he feel that such an individual could think of himself as having some freedom?
4. What does Krutch believe laboratory findings will inevitably conclude concerning free will?
5. Do behaviorists believe that in principle, complete prediction of human behavior is possible?
6. Why does Krutch believe there will always be a limit on the degree to which behavioral scientists can account for human behavior?
7. Why does Krutch believe that science has not been very successful in dealing with human behavior?
8. What does Krutch consider the strongest possible evidence against what the author terms the "mechanistic hypothesis"?
9. Krutch believes that the introduction of consciousness in the course of human evolution introduced a "qualitative novelty". What does this suggest to him?
10. Do psychologists accept the reality of consciousness?
11. Do psychologists feel that consciousness is compatible with determinism?
12. What is the parallelist's position?
13. According to the parallelist, what corresponds to every psychical state?
14. According to I. E. Farber, what may influence choice behavior?
15. How will the order of nature be discovered?
16. What, according to the author, is a scientific law?
17. What is the scientist's belief in regularity based on?
18. What must Krutch and other non-determinists admit concerning regularity?
19. How does the regularity in the world and our knowledge of it affect our freedom?
20. What can we do with our scientific knowledge?
21. What effects would there be as a result of halting scientific research?
22. What is the contradiction in Krutch's attitudes toward psychologists?
23. What psychological effects do critics fear in the growth of man's knowledge of behavioral science?
24. Why are critics uneasy with concepts of man which state that behavior is not entirely determined (for instance, "minimal man")?
25. Does Skinner's definition of control destroy the experience of freedom?
26. What do laymen have in mind when they speak of "being controlled"?
27. How have Skinner's critics been unwise in their attack upon him?