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Maintenance
of Interventions: The Behavioral Research Supervisory System
Richard W. Malott
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Now, Nadia, to your original questions:
What characteristics of the BRSS helped in its maintenance?
Probably none. Of course, the system is effective. But I think that's
not your point. I think your point is what contributes to the maintenance
or lack of maintenance of systems, given that they are effective.
And what contributed to the lack of maintenance of the BRSS?
Everything.
BRSS is a performance-management system. And essentially all PM systems
that I know of are very effortful and have only small immediate benefits,
though their cumulative benefits can be great, over a period of time.
All of which spells failure of maintenance; which is why you're doing
your thesis on this topic.
So why is the BRSS maintaining? Answering this takes us
an issue we behavior analysts rarely discuss. The "personality,
temperament, or belief structure" of the person responsible for
the system. So that means, we need to discuss my favorite subject-me,
tasteless though that may be. The reason the BRSS is again doing well
in my overall system, which I call BATS (the Behavior Analysis Training
System) has more to do with the characteristics of my orientation
than it does with the characteristics of the BRSS.
First, I view almost everything I do from a systems perspective.
As my former colleague, Neil Kent, knew and exploited, all he had
to do was put the word, "system" after a task; and I'd willingly
take it on, no matter how odious-"Malott, will you be in charge
of the garbage-disposal system?" "Yes, sir."
But, what does "system" mean, in the context of the BRSS.
It means, that when we consider an individual student's performing
or failing to perform an individual research task, we don't consider
this as the result of a unique, idiosyncratic circumstantial and personality
quirk. Instead, we consider this performance or failure to be characteristic
of many or most students in many or most circumstances. (In deed,
40% of all Ph.D. students in the United States fail to complete their
dissertations.)
The traditional view is to blame the victim, which is what four out
of four JABA reviewers did when they rejected the Garcia article on
the BRSS, not arguing that the research design was poor or the data
not significant, but that it was essentially immoral to establish
a performance-management system that would help the weak sisters survive
the rigors of graduate training, which the reviewers viewed as more
of an IQ/moral-fitness test than an educational program.
So, part of the systems view of human performance is to consider
performance to be a function of a set or system of external, controlling
variables (mainly behavioral contingencies). Now most behavior analysts
give lip service to this, but I observe few practicing it outside
of their immediate area of expertise (e.g., children labeled "autistic");
they don't apply it to their students, their family, their colleagues,
or themselves. Instead, if a person screws up, it's because the person
is a screw up; the behavior analysts blame the victim of the pathological
behavioral contingencies, almost as readily as everyone else does.
And a related part of this systems view is that the behavioral contingencies
(typically pathological behavioral contingencies) are fairly common.
So, if a research student fails to do a task today, there's a good
chance he will fail to do one tomorrow (which gives rise to our most
fundamental general rule: the best predictor of future behavior is
past behavior [regardless of the behavor's rationalizations]). Furthermore,
if this student failed to do this research task, many other students
will probably fail to do similar tasks. Then, with that orientation,
we keep our eyes open and maybe even collect a little "base-line"
data, to see if we've identified a common problem area (e.g., student
failure to complete research tasks). And, usually it turns out that,
yes, we are dealing with common, frequent problems.
So this part of the systems view is that most human problems are
performance problems, that most performance problems are a result
of pathological contingencies, and that most performance problems
and their causal pathological contingencies are common rather than
unusual.
The next part of the systems view is that you can set up healthy,
helpful PM contingencies that will support good performance (e.g.,
the BRSS); and, though expensive, it will usually be cost-effective
to set up those PM contingencies.
Then, the system needs a prime mover (e.g., I'm the prime mover of
the BRSS) and depending on how many systems the prime mover is moving,
the system may need a systems manager (e.g., Mike Dillon and Maria
Garcia were the original BRSS systems mangers and Michelle Seymour
has been the most recent). All of this requires a fair amount of self-awareness
(e.g., I don't have my act together enough to get myself to do single
handedly everything needed for a successful BRSS). And this awareness
of ones limitations often points to the need for considerable expertise
at delegatory technology, the art of getting others to do reliably
everything for which you are ultimately responsible, with between
80 and 200% of the quality that would result if you, yourself did
those tasks.
So one of my belief-structure characteristics responsible for the
survival of BRSS is my thorough-going systems orientation. Without
that orientation, there would never have been nor would there now
be a BRSS.
The other characteristic is the establishing operation, my fairly
heavy guilt load, my fear of being a scum bag. I believe that, if
I know what should be done and I don't do it, then I'm a scum bag
(e.g., if there's a brother who needs keeping and I ain't keeping
him, I'm a scum bag or maybe a sleaze ball). The extent to which I
succeed as a systems prime mover is the extent to which I'm running
from fear of guilt. The extent to which I fail is the extent to which
I really am a scum-bag sleaze ball. I would argue that essentially
all professionally successful people, including behavioral systems
prime-movers/managers, come from a behavioral history that has set
up fear of guilt as an effective establishing operation. I would argue
that this is also true of us semi-successful people, as well.
I think prime-movers can be helped by PM contingencies (e.g., I make
big personal use of externally monitored self-management contracts).
However, I don't think we have the PM skills to generate really high-quality
work (Gilbert's class work) and high quantity work from prime-movers,
and maybe from anyone, if the PM contingencies aren't functioning
hand in hand with fear/guilt trips that our parents set in motion
before we entered grade school.
Jack Michael put it something like this: You've got a stack of articles
you're supposed to write, a stack of quizzes you're supposed to grade,
and a stack of letters you're supposed to answer; and you're behind
on all of them. You whittle away at one stack until the guilt associated
with one of the other stacks becomes so overwhelming that you shift
over to it. Around and around, forever guilt driven from one stack
to another.
Maria Malott put it somewhat like this: We're watching the Jugglers,
Acrobats, and Magicians of the Peking Opera Company (or something
like that) at Miller Auditorium. A cocky young man comes out in a
white suit with a black, satin shirt and strikes a John Travolta,
Saturday Night Fever pose. Then his lovely little assistant slides
out a long, rectangular table and arranges four plates in a row. The
dude starts each plate spinning on its edge, one at a time; then folds
his arms and smiles complacently at the audience. But eventually,
one of the plates slows down and is about to fall dormant to the table
surface. The dude rushes over and sets it rapidly spinning again,
repeating this with the remaining three in the same just-in-time manner.
He loses his composure a bit, however when the assistant slides out
another table with four more plates, which dude feels obligated to
start spinning as well. Now, as he gets the last plate spinning, the
first one verges on dormancy. So he breathlessly, rushes to the rescue,
as assistant slides out another table and four plates. Etc., until
poor dude is desperately keeping 20 plates spinning, breathlessly
running from plate to plate. Maria suggested this was an excellent
model of the way our professional lives work.
So, even though you may have a thorough-going systems view and plenty
of guilt, you usually can't keep all the plates spinning.